When, on 30 September 2005, Jyllands-Posten published a series of cartoons depicting the Prophet Mohammed it did so in the name of freedom of expression. Muslims and other religious groups, the editors claimed, had to accept that any religious symbol could be the object of satire and ridicule and that such irreverence of religion-taken-seriously was an essential aspect of a secularized public realm. Indeed, mocking religious figures was seen by many as a civic virtue, part of an informal style of Danish anti-authoritarianism, which newcomers had to learn (Rasmussen, 2005) . Reactions to the unfolding events, including those of various dictatorial regimes in the Middle East and the plight of the cartoonists in hiding, opened deep divisions across traditional ideological lines, in which principles were involved (freedom of speech, blasphemy, religious tolerance/recognition, press responsibility, public civility) and what their meanings were.
When a large majority of the French parliament in February 2004 passed a law prohibiting the wearing of visible religious symbols in state schools a different idea of secularism was implied. The wearing of headscarves by Muslim girls was framed by various commentators as a matter of either religious freedom or female autonomy/oppression (Laborde, 2006 ). Yet, retreat from laïcité (secularism, the secular state) also connoted an unwillingness on the part of some French to accord equality to citoyens who identified with their republic whatever their private inclinations. In other countries, notably the US and Britain, religious headwear is less controversial and associated with quite different conceptions of religion, pluralism and public sphere -each incidentally understanding itself as a manifestation of 'secularism' (Levinson, 1997; Modood and Kastoryano, 2006) .
In Germany, moves away from the traditional ius sanguinis naturalization policy to accommodate the large population of German-born Turks without citizenship reflect a political contest between two types of republicanism, where one (liberal egalitarian) sees citizenship as facilitating integration, while the other (statist communitarian) sees it as a reward bestowed only on those who have successfully achieved it (Faist and Triadafilopoulos, 2006) . With extensive powers vested in the Verfassungsschutz institution to monitor minority associations and to screen or block 'Islamist' applicants suspected of terrorist sympathies, including groups who explicitly recognize the constitution yet work with 'subtle means', the growth in naturalizations in Germany whereby Turks in particular 'are increasingly becoming citizens who fight for their rights and seek to establish them by democratic means' has brought with it a form of 'moral panic' (Schiffauer, 2006: 6, 98) . Ius soli comes at a price. In Germany, historically, citizenship was essentially a legal category, associated with a political culture of passivity (Turner, 1990) . Allowing immigrants to acquire this status has invested it with a new civic pathos, which has also securitized it. The French tradition assumes any child born in the republic to be willing and capable of becoming a good citizen. In Germany lowering the citizenship threshold has necessitated defining which values and competences characterize a truly democratic citizen, and screening out intruders who do not possess them.
The move towards political solutions
These incidents have several features in common. First, they indicate a turn in Western political culture to what this book calls political solutions to cultural conflict. In Western Europe cultural conflict signifies religious conflict, with Islam as the all but inevitable Other . Western societies are converging on ostensibly civic understandings of national communities, although clearly, as the examples show, 'civic' carries diverse connotations and consequences in different places. Governments certainly still wish to privilege majority heritage and traditions, and migration pressure continues to fuel political concessions to the New Right (Hedetoft, 1999) . However, with the human rights revolution, urbanization and cultural globalization, the idea of a powerful kulturnationalism as gatekeeper and integration, an old-fashioned assimilation style is clearly on the wane. The dominant rhetorical style counter-poses 'political' to 'cultural', 'universal' to 'particularistic' values and principles, the latter to be kept at a distance in a private realm and the former standing for more modern, rational, 'thinner' types of solidarity.
Secondly, in this opposition, cultural and religious identities are strongly politicized and presented as problems, indeed as security problems (Waever, this volume). Western majorities, on the other hand, are associated with modernity, rationality and universal values. Multiculturalism has an increasingly poor press and is equated with anti-liberalism and relativism, as opposed to notions of liberal multiculturalism, and above all the danger of social and political disintegration.
Hence, thirdly, while recognizing that a plural modern community must be conceptualized as thin, political and universal, Western societies are also increasingly concerned with who and what we can see ourselves to be as a community, to have sufficient commitment, loyalty and willingness to pay taxes to strangers. French concepts of integration and social cohesion which have taken some flak at home are spreading to Germany, Denmark, The Netherlands and even Great Britain (Goodhart, 2004) and fitted into new discursive contexts. What cohesion really means is far from clear. The idea of a Leitkultur still begs the question of what type and degree of cultural sameness is required. National identity concerns, moreover, are tied to -or confused with -ideas of specific civic competences, and both are conceptualized in contrast, on the one hand, to traditional nationalism assumed left behind and, on the other, minority parallel societies.
Theoretically, these movements constitute a play of conceptualizations within three different conceptions of politics and of politics as responses to 'culture', the first two of which have been traced by the conceptual historian Kari Palonen (2006) . One is a conception of politics as a legally delineated sphere. Here, political denotes constitutional protections, rights and immunities, which are taken out of public contestation, thereby defining legitimate forms of human interaction and the exercise of power. Secondly, a political community or identity denotes a form of communality and belonging which is specifically civic as opposed to ethnic or cultural. Thirdly, politics refers to an activity and its concomitant competences and virtues.
All this appears to lower the normative threshold of political community. It seems easier to affirm abstract liberal principles and values than to conform to an entire way of life. It is easier to identify with a polity than to share a nation that was in place before one's arrival. Acting as a citizen is less taxing than sharing all of life's communal dimensions. The contributors to this volume agree, at some level, that old-style nationalistassimilatory versions of these thresholds are a thing of the past, and that the modern community must in some sense be political. In a moment we shall look at some of these responses at the level of theory. Before we do so, we shall note the reasons why the political turn is a quite demanding one.
Politics as (political) culture
The turn to politics-as-response-to-culture is itself an indication of culture, or, we may say, a culturalization of politics. This means a number of things, which correspond to different connotations of the term culture. In the final section of this introduction it is argued that the turn to politics needs to be analysed as a form of a new civic nationalism, which is implicated in various types of unacknowledged particularism. At this stage the different if related point is that the movement is towards treating politics increasingly as culture, or to what may be termed political or civic culture.
The connotation of culture here is not the romantic or anthropological one of particular identity, but the earlier Enlightenment association with Bildung, civility and civilization. Culture concerns the progress and perfectibility of norms, identities and practices in relation to communal life and political affairs. Political or civic culture is liberal or universal culture. Moreover, each of the three moves towards this type of high political Culture (with a capital 'C') at the same time constitutes culture (anthropological 'cultural culture', with a small 'c') as an obstacle and backwardness.
First, political values and norms are not mere legal rules to which private individuals must comply. They must be positively internalized. We must carry the constitution in our hearts and show the world that we do so in citizenship ceremonies or naturalization tests. We must let these principles override private or cultural inclinations, let the latter become shaped and coloured by the former, stand up for them and transmit them as a heritage to new generations and newcomers. We must also actively identify with institutions and compatriots and maintain a modernist sense of community, which again overrides any group commitment. Finally, the modern polity requires that we act, and become socialized into acting, as citizens. In short, we cannot simply be private selves with private pursuits; we must be members of a culture of citizenship.
To each aspect of politics-as-culture (values/principles, identity, virtuous activity) correspond assumptions of traditional minority culture, which mirror traditional anthropology and early relativistic multiculturalism. Commentators (e.g. Phillips, 2007) increasingly note how discourses of multiculturalism, favourable as well as unfavourable, present cultures as essential vessels of meaning, exaggerating their stability, absence of internal conflict and comprehensively explicable content. Culture as cause of human action is similarly overstated and independent reflection by its carriers overlooked. Essentializing minority culture generally entails politicization of such culture. While pluralism is seen as inevitable and legitimate per se, it requires discipline and drawing of lines in the sand. Minority culture becomes problem-culture, imbued with risk and uncertainty, in need of modification and fixing, but also difficult to modify or fix. The need to place constitutional principles above culture and unlearn parts of the latter gets stressed in connection with practices which are seen to militate against these principles in specific national contexts (e.g. freedom of speech ϭ acceptance of religious mockery; secularism ϭ absence of religious symbols in public space). In similar fashion virtues of tolerance or civic deliberation are framed as an escape from traditions, which are inherently incompatible with such practices.
Citizenship discourse -four vocabularies of political responses to culture
In Western political discourse the three elements of political cultureaffirming and internalizing values and principles, sharing overarching identities and learning democratic civic virtues -are also stable elements in a very influential turn towards citizenship as a progressive idiom (e.g. Favell, 2001 ). This discourse has been employed differently in diverse national contexts, to address different problems, of passive citizenship/subjecthood (Australia), regional disintegration or federal legacy (Spain, Italy, Germany) or lack of constitutionalism (UK). In countries like Australia, citizenship discourse is in principle aimed at newcomers and residents alike -e.g. encouraging resident British nationals to adopt Australian citizenship. In Europe, however, the vocabulary of citizenship is mainly employed as a response to problems of migration, its proponents often overlooking that strong citizenship ideals, whatever flavour and ideological pedigree, is far from fully established among the old majority population.
At one level this looks like a political theory movement from liberalism (rights and constitutionalism) towards republicanism (participation and civic virtue) and back to communitarianism (identity and belonging). In fact, each of these three political responses to culture, which correspond to conventional analytical dimensions of citizenship (Eder and Giesen, 2001) , takes place inside broad traditions of theorizing pluralism, each of which conceptualizes the predicament of speaking politics to culture in different ways. An entire range of positions -liberal, republican, communitarian and multicultural to use convenient labels -are all pushed towards political restatements.
They are political, first, in the sense of accepting relatively less common ground ('thinness') among members of a community, and further conceptualizing this ground as above and beyond comprehensive ethical universes ('formality'). Another way of putting it is that political theorists these days are all liberal, even if they are liberal republicans, liberal communitarians or liberal multiculturalists. But they are also political in the second sense that the spheres, practices and identities of proper thinness and formality become invested with a strong civicness. Whatever else they are, the communities of moderns are citizens' communities (Schnapper, 2001) . Thinness thickens when each vocabulary encounters cultural pluralism as a condition for citizens to endure, navigate or transcend -e.g. in tolerance, deliberation, agonal contestation, self-critical interpretation of one's own national tradition or intercultural dialogue.
Moreover, each register of political community and cultural pluralism links to real-life discourses. The following sections sketch the main vocabularies of political solutions to cultural conflict, including some of their shortcomings and ambiguities.
Liberalism and constitutional patriotism
A liberal register of politics involves the separation of a public and a private sphere, which constitutes one as a space of debate on common affairs and another as a protected realm of individual rights. Disagreement remains on the comprehensiveness of the latter, notoriously between egalitarians and libertarians. To liberals culture refers to private particularism, and cultural pluralism, more or less benign (Rosenblum, 1994) , is a function of the individual pursuit of universes of value which spring from group memberships in civil society. Because pluralism of life projects is inevitable -indeed cherished and encouraged -the only reasonable conception of political community is a scheme of 'the right' as opposed to 'the good' (Rawls, 1993) .
Liberal problems with culture, above all religion, have several aspects. One concerns practices which fall outside the bounds of liberal tolerance, because they are oppressive or are themselves intolerant. Another concerns values and beliefs which are held too uncompromisingly and unreflectively, thus jeopardizing an autonomous life, which is either valuable for its own sake or politically important as underpinning the democratic reasoning of liberal citizens (cf. Rawls, 1993 with Kymlicka, 1995 . A third culture problem concerns motivation. To Rawls (1993) a community is stable only if liberal principles can be affirmed from inside diverse comprehensive worldviews -a condition which becomes the more demanding as such principles themselves admit of a measure of reasonable pluralism. But liberals are also challenged from the outside as to whether formal principles can integrate a community in the first place (Taylor, 1989) . May, indeed, the lauded irony of self-decentring individuals, while facilitating inclusiveness, jeopardize the types of solidarity that come with personal inconvenience or sacrifice, a fortiori, if the favoured political community is a redistributive and participatory one? Is there a trade-off, so that one must accept any collective identity at hand (including nationalism and traditional religion) to have solidarity even where this means compromising on liberal principles?
While such criticism has been voiced by liberal nationalism (below), an influential response has employed the concept of constitutional patriotism. Originally directed against the particularism of traditional nationalism rather than religion (Habermas, 1992) , debates over constitutional patriotism, also prominent in this volume (see Nimni, Fossum, Ifversen and Maynor) , are complex and growing. They share liberal interpretations of the three turns to citizenship as culture outlined above. Solidarity must derive its legitimacy from (overlapping) consensus on liberal constitutional values. Liberalism is compatible with patriotism in the sense of accepting and maintaining national boundaries, and the direction and constraints of a liberal consensus are compatible with, indeed may be supported by, emotional attachment towards distinct polities, which embody specific traditions or identities. Finally, partaking in this liberal solidarity requires an active citizenship stance in the form of situated political dialogues or processes of self-interpretation of national political cultures.
Important differences exist. Some concern the fit between particularistic cultures, universal principles and motivation. Is motivation done by principles as such, or do principles require a particularistic backing to become effective? If the latter, do principles merely constrain the range of admissible, but necessary emotional attachments, including national and ethnic ones (and how much)? Should they help debunk such identities, or does criticism of identities also involve their re-construction (Føllesdal, 2000; Lacroix, 2002) ?
One unexamined ambiguity is whether to regard constitutional patriotism as a normative ideal which should and could unite citizens in a polity, and also inform the citizenship regime of a given country (Fossum, this volume), or more sociologically as a modern, reflective-but-nationallysituated solidarity. Is the issue one of urgently needing particularistic identities to have effective motivation, or the rather different one of accepting such ties as inevitable, but making them safe for liberalism (Føllesdal, 2000) ? Another ambiguity concerns the nature of contextualization. Does particularity denote national versions of liberalism so that each people must customize liberalism to its culture circumstances in order to feel bound by it? Are values rendered 'concrete' (rather than 'particularistic') simply by being enshrined in a constitution -an institution, one may note, which is invested with varying degrees of pathos in different countries (Ingram, 1996) ? Do liberal values become charged with emotion and identity simply by linkage to institutions, or does history and broader political culture play a role (Markell, 2000; Laborde, 2002) ?
Authors who employ the concept often appear to have somewhat unrealistic assumptions about the coherency and authority of constitutional traditions. In any country groups admire different constitutional principles and associated institutions, or press to have existing settlements altered, sometimes by reference to arrangements elsewhere. Some favour Swedish welfare institutions or American checks and balances. Others are alienated by nanny states or democratic impotence. Britain, France and Denmark have never had a real constitutional tradition. Constitutional patriots 'underestimate the level of indeterminacy of liberal-democratic ideals' (Laborde, 2002: 602) , also when they acknowledge a reasonable diversity of liberalisms, but assume homogeneous interpretations inside countries. Having a thinner set of principles as the core of consensus is no solution, as adversarial politics will build and amend contested settlements way beyond such a core. Citizens, it may be argued, continue to share a political project, not because they identify with all underlying principles, but despite the fact that they do not.
Although the civic turn in Europe may look like a vindication of Habermas's progressive concept and as a relatively unmixed blessing (Müller, 2007 ), important differences remain between then and now, in Germany and elsewhere. To Habermas -who certainly did not convince all Germans at the time (Rossteutcher, 1997) -the concept was largely formulated as a critique, loosening national and ethnic identities and their associated histories and a way to insert them in a new Europe without borders. In Spain it has been used, still with reference to history, to legitimate a constitutional arrangement of regional autonomies ('multinationalism'), offering an overarching solidarity of citizens and minorities (Nuñez, 2001) . In Italy it signified a culture of legality, responsible citizenship and minimal common national purpose, and was criticized as such for its impotence (Rusconi, 1993) , a sense of common national purpose in the face of regionalism and secession. At stake in these debates was no specific interpretation of principles, but promotion of Rechtstaat, citizenship and state responsiveness against nationalism, regionalism and neoliberalism.
By contrast, since the mid-1990s, the solidarity of liberal values has had religious pluralism, above all Islam, as its backdrop. Not self-criticism and progressive politics, but the need to stand firm on 'our liberal values', and to do so in the name of a reconstructed concept of the nation. A recent analysis (Mouritsen, 2006a: 81-3 ) of Denmark's Leitkultur debate exemplifies this. It demonstrates that although politicians who speak of 'common values' assume the high Habermasian ground of equality, democracy and human rights, this does not render the discourse inclusive. Party programmes present these values as embedded in the social fabric of society, as emerging from the past of the Danish people, but also as inaccessible. They are an old, unbreakable and unchangeable cultural whole which is difficult for others, particular Muslims, to share. By contrast to a Kantian view, where allegiance arises from a functioning cooperation in justice, wherever one may find it (Lacroix, 2002) , these universal and non-negotiable values also often come across as intrinsically Danish, even universal qua Danish. They invariably get presented as not just uncontested internally, but also as superior, due to happy historical and geographical circumstances (freeholder agrarianism, smallness), which less fortunate nations have not enjoyed.
In a similar way, the requirement to affirm a list of political values has become institutionalized as an entry requirement in the naturalization process of many countries, often tied to citizenship declarations, ceremonies and tests which use a range of emotive mechanisms well known from early nation-building, and assuming more or less benign and demanding forms (Damsholt, this volume). The perceived clash between non-negotiable (liberal) secularism and (fundamentalist) religion in the West (Waever, this volume) highlights similar ambiguities in terms of the questionable status of the universalism it celebrates. Many liberal principles and institutions have non-secular -Christian -origins, and there are almost as many ways of dividing religion and politics as there are national political traditions.
Instrumental liberal neo-nationalism
In the Danish debate, politicians stress that affirming liberal values and learning the country's civic styles does not require old-fashioned cultural assimilation (Mouritsen, 2006a: 82) . Even so, the offer of a universal citizen identity often slides towards a stratum of 'cultural culture' (i.e. language, heritage, even religion), indicating a competing discourse of integration.
However, this is not generally speaking a traditional communitarian idea, which privileges ethnic culture on independent grounds to do with cultural expression or self-assertion (Miller, 1995: 49-80) . The most influential public national identity theory argues that some homogeneity, and its maintenance through education, assimilation and immigration control, is necessary and hence legitimate not only to have community, but above all to have a well-functioning liberal community, a fortiori a redistributive, strongly participative one. The argument, which comes in several versions (Abizadeh, 2002) , is that citizens are more likely to have trust -based on common interest, ease of communication or identification -where the life of a nation is characterized by a homogeneous culture. This view, which we may call instrumental liberal neo-nationalism, has its roots in Rousseau and nineteenth-century liberalism. Contemporary versions include Dominique Schnapper (2001) in France and David Miller (1995) in Britain. In public debates the view is tied to a sceptical representation of multiculturalism as implying the existence of parallel societies (Goodhart, 2004) .
The conception of politics at stake is liberal in the sense of a distinction between a public realm of collective decisions and a private realm of rights. A separate distinction is made between individual or group-based identities and the shared public or political culture and identity of the nation. But whereas liberals would conceptualize the latter as a universal political Culture (the Bildung of liberal values and citizenship) in the instrumental national view every nation has its own flavour of public culture and sense of nationality, in which political life is embedded. This is not just cultural in the sense of particular or specific but also in the sense of including elements from what liberals see as the non-political sphere of heritage, customs, national identity, even religion; and in regarding the distinction between the levels as difficult to draw. The boundaries of this more or less thick public culture are flexible. To Miller, 'a national identity requires that the people who share it should have something in common, a set of characteristics that in the past was often referred to as a "national character", but which I prefer to describe as a common political culture'. The latter in turn may be seen as a set of understandings about how a group of people is to conduct life together. This will include political principles such as belief in democracy or the rule of law . . . social norms such as filling in your tax return or queuing as a way of deciding who gets on the bus first. It may also embrace certain cultural ideals, for instance religious beliefs or a commitment to preserve the purity of the national language. (Miller, 1995: 25-6) While assuming an ethnic core, Miller recognizes that nationality is also constructed. Indeed, his theory is very much about deliberate maintenance and contestation of an artificial common culture. It is Rousseau's world, not Herder's, a form of deliberative assimilation philosophy. Newcomers must learn to appreciate the common culture and relegate much of their own background to the private realm. But as citizens they have a say in making this public culture more inclusive. The virtues of neo-nationalism include dialogue, impartiality and restraint -not old-fashioned custody of the majority tradition's authenticity. Correspondingly, problematic (minority) culture is an inherently unreflective, un-transcendable, noncompatible culture and particularly such minority culture which refuses to enter the integration dialogue.
Miller's theory has been criticized (Føllesdal, 2000; Abizadeh, 2002) . Debates concern the causality of trust and solidarity in social groups and individual minds, whether homogeneity is a sufficient -even a necessarycondition for bringing about either, and if it is, also the requisite type, comprehensiveness and degree of such homogeneity. While lack of solidarity and trust is often associated by political scientists with empirical ethnic heterogeneity (Putnam, 2007) , it is less clear that it jeopardizes the possibility of a welfare state (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006) . Indeed, Scandinavian welfare state theorists stress institutional path dependencies of functioning and just institutions and the rational appreciation of reciprocity by welfare state citizens (Rothstein, 2005) . Such reciprocity, arguably, still requires that others actually exhibit a sufficient work and taxpaying capacity to be partners in a welfare state -a form of 'homogeneity' in terms of citizenship capacity, which new immigrants may not always possess.
Of course, some theorists of ethnicity will maintain that the differences that constitute shared identity are products of boundary maintenance rather than this or that shared cultural trait (Barth, 1969) . Accepting a soft constructivism of imagined communities (Anderson, 1983) introduces ambiguity between what a community has learnt to think it has in common and which values or characteristics it actually, empirically, shares. It facilitates a further slide from national public culture to a sense of shared fate or identity, which appears to do the work in ethnically and linguistically heterogeneous nations like Switzerland (Miller, 1995: 194-5) . At any rate, it is far from clear that attempts at homogenization -as in the heyday of nationalism, when peasants were turned into Frenchmen, Italians and Danes -are at all feasible if, as claimed by Bhikhu Parekh, 'a culturally homogeneous society whose members share and mechanically follow an identical body of beliefs and practices is today no more than an anthropological fiction' (Parekh, 1997) .
Be that as it may, we may ask how a discourse of integration with this basic argumentative structure -common culture as necessary for distributive and democratic institutions -actually functions politically. Here, several familiar problems emerge. First, there is some distance between a political theory which requires a shared public culture and public debates which invariably centre on our shared (national) culture. Also, the language of instrumental nationalism is easily conflated with older languages about the moral right of the majority culture to dominate, and with chauvinist assumptions about this culture's superiority (Mouritsen, 2006a) . Emphasis on homogeneity and assimilation in its name appears pragmatically opposed to self-criticism and dialogue. Unlike traditional nationalism, which allows space for those who cannot and should not be integrated in the first place, instrumental nationalism raises the stakes considerably by making integration (cultural assimilation) a matter of securing the health or survival of society itself. In this process, by the very nature of discourse, a vocabulary of instrumental homogeneity becomes a flexible, disciplinary tool, which keeps the markers of cultural assimilation vague and undefined (Modood, 1994) .
Particularly pertinent is a tendency (also in theory) to confuse the instrumentally required 'shared culture' with the type of political 'Culture' (trust, solidarity, deliberative democracy, willingness to distribute, etc.), which the former is meant to facilitate. This syndrome again relates to the tendency simply to define what 'we have in common' in terms of broad political values, treasured institutions and generally agreeable things, such as democracy, the welfare state and tolerance. The equation presumes a binary opposition between two equally essentialized forms of culture: culture 1, civil and progressive culture, which is what 'we' happen to have arrived at around here; and culture 2, which is the backward, uncivil culture, within which 'they' remain caught. This equation has a mystifying effect. If part of the distrust and lack of solidarity between, say, majorities and immigrants has to do with a (real or erroneously believed) lack of certain civic skills or liberal practices, debates should concern which practices, attitudes and skills are needed in a democratic society and whether they are lacking. What is needed may be neither more shared or common culture as such nor more of 'our' culture, but more civic culture, as well as a greater understanding of what this means in a pluralist society.
Openness to newcomers is no doubt a scarce good. In this volume Nimni disputes liberal belief, in particular Habermas's, in a purely civic statecommunity based on voluntary adherence to liberal values. Contemporary liberals who think a working sense of justice produces effective obligation (Patten, 1996) ignore what nineteenth-century liberals knew -that wellordered states started as, and remain, nations. Indeed, nowhere is reliance on the nation, or on some functional equivalent of it, more evident than in recent discussions among liberals who accept (against moral cosmopoltans) bounded societies, but search for ways to deal with dilemmas of moral obligation and moral psychology in the face of immigration (Buchanan and Moore, 2003) .
While it is unclear that solidarity requires cultural homogeneity, it does seem plausible that the internal cohesion of modern states requires an identity through time, i.e. a sense of common past, present and future. Moreover, such identities are most likely 'ethnic', at least as predicates of distinct peoples. Peoples here have elementary a priori emotional ties and effective obligations towards kin -concretely, one's own children and the children of those who are considered members of the people now (Canovan, 2000) -meaning such ties and obligations which do not generally require specific actions, affirmations, attributes or competences to be activated, as is the case with newcomers. The most open society will still have some sense of privileging those who are there already. However, what, over and beyond elementary kinship, can constitute the imagined identity substance (or competing conceptions of it) of this group -e.g. religion, language, historical narrative, sense of shared fate -and which parameters of inclusion of newcomers will operate, are contingent questions.
Republicanism and civic patriotism
A third registry of political solutions to cultural conflict, in some ways a middle path between the former two, is the republican one. Republican theory and discourse stand divided on its central ideas. While all agree on a conception of politics that emphasizes civic virtue, the maintenance of a public sphere and some form of self-government, the requisite virtues and types of activity remain disputed, and quite different theorists, including some that have been discussed (Habermas and Miller) , associate themselves with different delineations and readings of the tradition.
In particular, the concept of liberty (Mouritsen, 2005a) divides Aristotelian civic humanist (Pocock, 1975) , communitarian (Sandel, 1996) , liberal (Dagger, 1997) , and neo-Roman readings (Pettit, 1997; Skinner, 1998; Maynor, 2003) . The latter regards republican liberty as a common good jointly secured by active citizens, but also a species of negative liberty, whereby citizens enjoy a set of mutual protections and liberties, which are defined and constituted by law, but where the specific content of this liberty is a product of self-government and hence, to some degree, historically contingent. In addition, bracketing different readings of the pathos of citizenship, civic status is associated also by civic humanists and communitarians with recognition, i.e. acknowledgement of contributions towards the common good (Honohan, 2002) .
Culture to a modern liberal republican at least (the tradition dates back long before invention of the concept) may be understood as private pursuits, which citizens may legitimately use their liberty for. But it may also be harmful particularism. Here, culture divides citizens, creates parochialism or separatism, and takes minds away from the common good. Culture, particularly in a French-Rousseauvian understanding, should be kept outside the public realm. Ethnic and religious identities compete with, and detract attention from, equal citizenship. Here, it tends to stand for backwardness, immaturity, lack of civic competence and above all inequalities of inherited tradition. But culture may be allowed inside this realm, when utilized as integrating background culture; not Rousseau's peasants' culture but civilization-carrying high culture, associated with Enlightenment rationalism and French language.
Two broad sets of political solutions to cultural conflict, both corresponding to old republican themes (Mouritsen, 2005b) and each picking up a thread from the section on nationalism, may be discerned. One concerns activity and virtue. By participating in common affairs -fighting in wars, serving on juries, deliberating in forums -newcomers earn recognition as citizens and learn to identify with common goods that unite individuals whatever their private diversity. Political action also inserts previously excluded voices in the shaping of common liberty. Another solution is patriotism as a civic identity, which springs from mnemonic narratives of predicaments, trespasses experienced, agreeements reached and institutions created in the history of liberty in specific communities. Patriotism unites all who contributed in the past with those who, by contributing now and in the future, carve a narrative space for themselves. Unlike nationalism, republican patriotism, because tied to liberty, can be rational and reflective. Indeed, according to Maurizio Viroli, foremost chronicler of republican patriotism, 'love of country' is 'a charitable love of liberty' which 'produces only liberty', whereas 'bigotry, intolerance, and war are the products of another love, that is, love or longing for oneness or uniqueness' (Viroli, 1995: 185) .
Each solution has been criticized. Criticism of participation and deliberation is as old as theories about it. To the extent that participation is more than a means to represent interests or control power, it raises questions of how much and when, and suggests functional issues of participation overload and coordination in modern societies. It is difficult to sustain, produces conflict as well as concord, and is biased towards the welleducated and resourceful. As regards patriotism, critics note the difficulty, even if the distinction makes sense in conceptual history, of separating patriotism and nationalism. 'Common liberty', after all, is particular peoples' liberty, of which there may be many interpretations. Struggles for independence and rights even in liberal states are linked to cherished ways of life, traditions fought for (including religions, languages, and ethnic symbols) and culturally bound notions of virtuous practice. Some narratives of liberty exclude old minorities who were on the losing side in wars, as well as newcomers who do not relate to its symbols and components. Insisting on emotion and pathos, moreover, borrows from the logic of nation-building and invites scepticism about the moral psychology of patriotism (Bader, 1999; Mouritsen, 2005b) .
Bracketing theory, one may consider the increasing appeal in public discourse to active citizenship and patriotic community identification, including citizenship ceremonies (Damsholt, this volume). What previously served the heavy-handed creation of national citizens in parochial peasant societies comes to mean something different in multicultural societies with Islamic groups. Explicated civic ideals form part of discursive opportunity structures, which immigrants -including Muslims -may exploit, but they do so with difficulty and at the risk of alienation. Contemporary republican citizenship discourse often constructs its virtues in direct opposition to religion, at any rate to religion taken seriously. The continuing affair de foulard and ensuing debates in France and elsewhere highlight this. The assumption of secular citizenship -even the pre-citizenship of adolescent education -as a neutral and rational identity forces some individuals to choose between citizenship and recognition as good Muslims. The artificial equality of republican citizens is counter-posed to religious hierarchy and the marks of sexual submission. And public autonomy -the ability to deliberate reasonably and independently -is counter-posed to religious authority, symbolized, of course, by the headscarf (Laborde, 2006) .
Recently, Denmark introduced a Declaration of Integration and Active Citizenship in Danish Society, which an immigrant signs when applying for permanent residence. It contains a 16-point list which newcomers must declare they understand and intend to follow. None of the points are about 'cultural' Danishness. Several stress the importance of being a selfsupporting and taxpaying citizen and learning to speak Danish. The declaration begins, innocently enough, 'I shall comply with Danish legislation and protect the Danish Democratic Principles in every respect', but continues on a when-did-you-stop-beating-your-wife track, impressing on immigrants that men and women have equal rights, that women are allowed to participate in politics, that beating one's children or spouse is illegal ('I understand and accept that it is illegal in Denmark to commit actual violence or threaten violence against one's spouse'), as is 'circumcision' of girls and forced marriage, that one must respect the 'Danish values' of sexual equality, freedom of speech and anti-discrimination, that one must report and stand up to terrorism, and that 'active commitment to the Danish society is a precondition for a good life in Denmark regardless of how long it will last' (Danish Ministry of Refugee, Immigration and Integration Affairs, 2007; emphasis added).
The purpose of a citizenship declaration, arguably, is as uncertain as that of a civic oath (Bauböck, 2002) . Terrorists will hardly be persuaded to mend their ways, nor will they give themselves up by refusing to sign. Immigrants are asked to confirm something that nationals are never confronted with. Still, oaths and confirmations may be seen as solemn rites of passage, pledges which confirm the value of citizenship. The Danish declaration, however, is both inept and insulting. It fits a political conception of Danish community, but does so in a chauvinistic way. It implies that such values are often not shared by newcomers, and that one cannot assume a willingness to internalize them in a manner that overrides religion.
In a similar vein (discussed by Waever, this volume), appeals in Western societies to secularism and placing religion below the rule of law politicizes in an exclusivist way the virtue of reasoning and rational dialogue. While such demands make sense in political theory, invoking them as an entry requirement to the public realm, apart from insults and stigma, may even constitute a double standard. To Waever, it arbitrarily excludes one (religious) form of irrationalism from real-world political dialogue, which in other respects hardly conforms to Habermasian strictures. In a different vein, we noted above that the Cartoon affair highlighted alternative ways of conceiving the required 'civicness' of a Danish public sphere, i.e. promoting irreverent, authority-mocking humour and teaching the religiously sensitive to put up with being offended -as an editorial style in a serious national newspaper rather than from the stage of a stand-up comedy show.
Muliculturalism and cultural dialogue
Multiculturalism grew out of criticism of the biases of Western political theory and society, i.e. its de facto privileging of the religions, symbols and histories of majority cultures and silencing of minorities. Colourblindness and neutrality merely masked assimilation, not only in Frenchstyle countries where integration into a national high culture was the only passage to full citizenship. Whereas first-generation academic multiculturalism, borrowing from postmodernism, tried to unmask the universalistic pretensions of liberal or republican values -i.e. 'Western' individualism, rights focus and ideals of neutrality -multiculturalism today is generally speaking set on liberal foundations, as is the majority of claims by Western minorities in the name of multiculturalism -this is a condition of their likelihood of success. Various new and old formulations by Will Kymlicka (1995) , Joseph Raz (1994) , Rainer Bauböck (1996) and Tariq Modood (2007) emphasize individual rights, internal group constraints and exit possibilities, but also employ in different ways deeper, more culturesensitive (or identity-status sensitive, e.g. Phillips, 2007) understandings of equal treatment, ranging from subsidies for background cultural structures and group rights to effective anti-discrimination laws and exemption rights to preferential treatment. In different ways individuals here should be recognized as both culturally different and equal citizens.
Also multiculturalism offers its distinct takes on politics and culture. In a world where heterogeneity is the norm, and where at least some of this heterogeneity consists of individuals who are also members of relatively organized and united religious or ethnic communities, politics as a response to cultural conflict may be conceptualized as complex forms of institutionalized power-sharing or constitutional settlements, a Foreign Office-type diplomatic democracy, or -more influentially, and mirrored in the official discourse of self-proclaimed multicultural states -as an ideology of habitual mutual respect and accommodation. Above all, it is a pragmatic feature of the acceptance of multiculturalism that any group recognizes the legitimacy of other groups, the right of all individuals to their belonging, and the prima facie reasonableness of 'culturalist' framing of needs and claims by other groups than one's own -even such that one is predisposed to dislike.
Correspondingly, problematic culture is culture that does not allow (gradual, gentle) liberal 'laundering' in terms of respect for individual rights (Kymlicka, 1995) , and cultural groups characterized by chauvinist particularism ('ours is the only true and right worldview') as opposed to 'operational relativism' ('what is good for us is not good for them'). Problem cultures are also those that (in the eyes of competing groups) masquerade as such -i.e. non-authentic, unstable, poorly integrated cultural groups -and which, as a matter of the administrative-political logic of a multicultural society, are difficult to represent and deal with in terms of clearly defined needs and mechanisms of policy.
The main problem of multiculturalism, in theory and practice, is the tendency towards group essentialism (Benhabib, 2002; Phillips, 2007) and employment of old-fashioned island-type ideas of culture (Bauman, 1999) . Interest and identity logics, difficult to escape by the young, apostates and internal reformers, are nurtured by the righteous custodians of religious or national tradition, and in turn fuel external stereotyping. Although recipients of multicultural policy are individuals and citizens, whose 'need of culture' (belonging, identity) is recognized, the very logic of multiculturalism is the public negotiation of which cultures are worthy in a given society. Arguably, only relatively stable settlement of minority status protects societies from hyper-politicized ethno-corporatist contests over new rights, resources and platforms of power, leaving ordinary poverty with a poor press. On the other hand, normal politics increasingly implies 'culture' as a political coinage among others, allowing entrepreneurs to mobilize group constituencies and frame claims according to the discursive political structures at hand in specific national settings (Koopmans and Statham, 2003) .
These problems are increasingly discussed in mainstream multicultural theory. There is more focus on the dialectics of power, stigma and status than on ascribed needs; on the diversity of minorities and types of cultural substance -above all the difference between North American and European conditions; and on the variable national contexts of claims. Moreover, a movement is visible, which brackets the more thorny philosophical questions about what constitutes illiberal practices and forms of life, how much to interfere in private lives to rectify them, and how to balance personal autonomy against perfectionist socialization -and towards concentrating, instead, on 'political' questions of exemption rights, anti-discrimination, community enhancement and public spacesharing in specific communities . Theoretically, also, multiculturalism is increasingly going civic. One example is Bhikhu Parekh's dialogical multiculturalism (Parekh, 2000; cf. Habermas, 1994; Benhabib, 2002) , which models the (re)framing of culture claims in ways that can be accommodated into the conceptual categories of liberal majority society. A theory that recognizes neither unequivocal liberal rights transcendence nor nationalist assimilation is almost predisposed to take this path. However, a backlash is taking place across Europe. Increasingly, the ideal of we-ness through cultural dialogue and recognition of difference, claimed by Parekh as well as such diverse writers as Kymlicka, Bauböck and Modood, is presented as succumbing to a reality of isolation and Verzeuiligung, which jeopardizes social cohesion and tolerance, as well as the autonomy to exit, criticize and hyphenate identities. It is by no means clear to what extent the existence of 'parallel societies', lack of identification with the national community, let alone fundamentalist sympathies can be blamed on multicultural policies, as opposed to, say, poor labour market segregation, political marginalization and low education attainment levels of immigrants. Indeed, the shift is very apparent in countries such as Germany, Denmark and France that never really had much multiculturalism at the level of policy. But it is also evident in the subtle realignment in Great Britain from a discourse of multiculturalism to one of integration-with-diversity, paradigmatically exemplified by the Commission for Racial Equality (2007) and its head Trevor Phillips (who succeeded Bhikhu Parekh), who does not so much criticize the various concrete policies in Britain of multicultural spacesharing as the danger that 'our racial or religious identity . . . becomes an obstacle to our belonging to the wider community' or constitute coercive 'identity wells' for young British Muslims or blacks (Phillips, 2006) .
Pluralist republicanism and community beyond the nation
The four vocabularies leave a sense of convergence. Everybody nowadays is a liberal. However, theory and public discourse increasingly demonstrate a comprehensive liberalism of deep autonomy and reflection. Moreover, each vocabulary is becoming civic in the sense of emphasis on activity, contestation and dialogue. From all perspectives cultural and religious pluralism as well as recalcitrant nationalisms require us to examine our own partialities, to question overly thick conceptions of community (but also to conceptualize thinner substitutes) and to enter into dialogue with others who share our political space. It requires an ability to live with pluralism and conflict as constitutive of community. Where does this leave us? While the contributors to this volume move in several directionsdescriptive, analytical or normative -from different starting points, it makes sense to speak of a clustering of theory around what may be loosely termed a new pluralist republicanism. In traditional republicanism (minority) culture is a civic distraction. But some of the contributors suggest or comment on reworkings of a republican politics -culture nexus, based on a politics of identity contestation and deliberative participation, which reopens cultures, mobilizes reinterpretation and facilitates dialogue.
First, while critical of liberal versions of constitutional patriotism, Ephraim Nimni condones Cecile Laborde's notion of civic patriotism, i.e. the idea that national solidarity and sense of belonging require that citizens be familiar with the relevant political culture in the sense of a shared conversational space, 'the malleable frameworks which sustains our political conversations over time' (Laborde, 2002 : 609) -even as some participants are critical of aspects of this space. Such ideas arguably correspond to more contextual readings of Habermas (Markell, 2000) , also discussed in this volume, which connect both motivation and legitimacy to critical engagement with the past and present of specific communities, embodying principles in national traditions but also rendering such traditions self-reflective -and thus more open to newcomers -because they are carried by groups of individuals including nations who care about and discuss 'who we are and want to be' (Habermas, 1990: 151) .
Nimni asserts that attention should still be paid to distinct ethnic/ national communities, each with its separate mnemonic vocabularies. A conversational space should be facilitated for all the distinct ethnic 'cultures of the republic', conceptualized in the form of an agonal patriotism giving the right to a created sense of overarching political belonging. Fossum (this volume) compares constitutional patriotism with Charles Taylor's deep diversity, the notion that a specific, geographic constellation of differences allows a sense of citizens' solidarity where belonging means different things to different groups. Both discussions re-cast the ancient category of republican patriotism to accommodate, first, the blurred boundaries in the first place between natio and patria; secondly, that 'a people's liberty' connects to (and will be normatively influenced in turn by) more than one set of historical-particular memories, and thirdly, that modern community requires dialogue between several distinct voices, who conceptualize past and future. Indeed, it is this dialogue, with its constant insertion of new memories and projects, rather than a specific 'identityoutcome', which integrates a community.
Different republican pedigrees, de-emphasizing the identity trail but giving attention to politics as collective self-legislation, are sought in this volume by John Maynor, and Richard Bellamy and Dario Castiglione, who go beyond the nation-state to the level of the European Union. Maynor develops Phillip Pettit's notion of republican non-domination (Pettit, 1997; Maynor, 2003) to facilitate a polity-centred conception of European citizenship, which he argues is more robust than constitutional patriotism, while Bellamy and Castiglione connect a language of participatory citizenship to a context of multi-level governance, characterized by a complex, overlapping pluralism of issues, advocacy groups and jurisdictions. While both approaches may be seen to conceptualize a reconstitution of distinct peoples' liberties, which gradually incorporates new reasonable demands, Maynor remains, at a European level, with a Rousseauvian (or Habermasian) perspective of a unitary polity united in a dialogue about the common good, whereas Bellamy and Castiglione rely on a republicanism of self-constituting, overlapping sovereignties.
Conceptualizing community beyond the state, ultimately in a cosmopolis, is a response to refugee flows, work migration and elite mobility. As people in a single life work, study, find partners, have children and incur obligations to institutions, projects and causes in different countries, nation-based citizenship models come under pressure, particularly when tied to comprehensive (social) rights schemes. Hannah Arendt's analysis of citizenship as a geographically bound, legally constituted 'right to have rights' underscores the plight of the superfluous and displaced (Arendt, 1958: 267-302) , but also the need for effective supranational entities. States which police their borders also increasingly restrict access to pension schemes and education for citizens returning from abroad, in the process undermining citizenship and certainly the remnants of jus sanguinis. Mobile elites, on the other hand, enjoy transnational corporate privileges and services, which crowd out their willingness to pay for national schemes, and leave states without one of the last solidarityenhancing mechanisms of capitalist modernity (Turner, 2001) .
It is not obvious, however, that state-based citizenship and nationcentred loyalties should be given up before the institutional foundations for supranational citizenship, and its mechanisms of solidarity and loyalty, have emerged (Laborde, 2002) . Even so, we need to customize or reinvent political theory to address the transformation of a nation-state framework in ways that correspond to real-life discourse about supranational and transnational identities (Ifversen, this volume). A divide has opened in theory and public debate between proponents of (nation-) state-centred ideas and those who search for regional or indeed global forms of solidarity. Contributions to this volume fall on both sides of this divide, from Nimni's assertion of the continued relevance of national and ethnic solidarities and Eder's 'realist' sociology of political community foundations to Bellamy's flexible Euro-transnationalism and Laustsen's and Diken's appeal to a Derridean politics of cosmopolitan friendship as the best hope of the displaced and superfluous of today -the transient refugees, the inhabitants of the modern camp.
The civic turn as culturalization of politics
Is the civic turn, visible across conceptual registers, a good thing? In real politics the new civics corresponds to discrediting traditional nationalism or the idea, Leitkultur or not, that old majorities deserve cultural supremacy. It has even been argued (Joppke, 2003) that the new integration ideologies overlie a structural convergence on universalistic, non-ethnic principles in migration and nationalization law and policy (whatever their harshness).
Whether 'our own kind first' is consistently waning awaits further investigation (Müller, 2007) . Be this as it may, the gains of speaking politics to culture remain ambiguous for reasons, which correspond to aspects of culturalization of politics, over and above the first meaning of this termi.e. the notion of a three-fold turn to politics as culture -which we noted in the beginning.
First of all, the charge that multiculturalists see culture as homogeneous and unchanging is just as relevant against other theories, despite variations in the stuff and thinness of communality proposed. They overlook the anthropological commonplaces that real observable systems of beliefs, practices and 'values' are overlapping, fragmented and contested. What is stipulated as a culture could be broken down in other ways for other purposes, is often mixed with similarly amorphous entities, and rarely corresponds to boundaries of states or to those sharing ethnies. This holds for Miller's public culture, with its fallback notion of a shared identification in countries like Switzerland as for Maurizio Viroli's patriotism, which implies that citizens of any class, age, region or political affiliation attach the same meaning to the rites of passage of the republic. Even proponents of constitutional patriotism tend to assume homogeneous interpretations of liberal principles inside countries.
Of course, some countries are more homogeneous than others. Yet often more diversity exists inside countries with strong national identity (e.g. the US) than between others with very similar values, which have not prevented historical antagonism (e.g. Denmark or Sweden). Homogeneity in important senses is what we make of it, and the very idea that sameness, of whatever kind, is constitutive of solidarity as such (as a necessary or sufficient condition) may be seriously flawed (Abizadeh, 2002 ). Yet the notion of a need for cultural or value homogeneity, a Leitkultur of sorts, is extremely influential in contemporary political discourse, as are attempts to talk such homogeneity into existence.
In part because the very notion of homogeneity as necessary to integration is so powerful, a second type of culturalization of politics is widespread. Culture here denotes not what a group shares in a behavioural sense, but what is represented in dominating discourse as shared. Whereas all sorts of cultural paraphernalia, from eating habits to humour, enter into the constructions of identity and difference, in terms of an English, German or Danish 'mentality', what is meant here are the specific conceptions of value, belonging and character traits, which become represented as entry requirements. Culturalized politics here means representations of who we are and what people like us, or people who want to take part in our community, must share (cf. Wodak et al., 1999) .
Because of their demarcating function these representations often become politicized forms of civil religion, markers of collective identity with a sacred, not-to-be-questioned-or-challenged character. Such culturalized political culture is analysed in Damsholt's anthropological discussion of past and present citizenship ceremony practices. From an international relations perspective, Waever shows its role in securitized constructions of 'secularism' and 'Islam', while Zapato-Barrero and Qasem highlight the different roles of 'Islam' as a (still negative) defining other in the national discourses of France and Spain.
Thirdly, we see a paradoxical double movement in these constructions. This is a culturalization of politics in the sense that ideas of what good citizenship means very often are represented as both particular and -in a certain sense -universal (Mouritsen, 2006a) . They become invested with meaning because they are definitions of the accomplishments of this community or nation, and as unchallengeable because, by losing them, we lose the bearings of who and what we are. But they are not just important in a relativist-communitarian sense. Their status is enhanced because they are conceived as also universal, i.e. more modern, civilized or liberal.
This movement whereby values and practices are both pseudoanthropological culture and a species of universal high Culture is part and parcel of the civic turn. On the one hand, the values and practices of a group are associated in the blunt categories of public discourse with universally shared values such as democracy, human rights and equalityoften in connection with a critique of old-fashioned nationalism (immigrants need do no more than love our 'political' values). On the other hand, these abstract principles are presented as accomplishments of distinct national histories and circumstances. General de Gaulle once stated that 'these values are universal, because they are French' (cited in Holm, 1993) , just as liberty in the US is intimately linked to the frontier and flight from European persecution. These narratives are sometimes innocent or benign and may contain kernels of truth, but they often assume exclusive forms. In Denmark, narratives of co-operative, freedom-loving peasants' and workers' movements, even the development of a particular brand of Lutheran 'secularism', imply that democracy, the welfare state and free-spiritedness are only genuine here, and that those born and bred in less fortunate places will find it difficult to learn civic practices, particularly if these places are Islamic countries (Mouritsen, 2006a) .
The dual pathos invested in ways of life, which are claimed to be both universal and intrinsically ours, involves a paradox, captured with a final meaning of culturalization. Here, what we do in fact share, or share in a significant degree, often remains -culture. Culture here signifies habits, cognitive frames and mutual expectations about how to interact, deliberate or solve conflicts, which we hardly speak about, let alone explain to others. Culturalization of politics here is the lack of scrutiny of, or debate about, the taken-for-granted nature of political ways of life. Politics here remains in a realm of culture, in the anthropological sense of micro-habits and goings on that are often too obvious to be reflected upon, unless we let ourselves be challenged to do so, and which are maintained simply as an unobserved background, as we busily talk of something else -such as 'our common values' and 'our culture'.
This predicament places in perspective a stable of all theory strands discussed above, i.e. the need for self-critical appraisal of a community's own values, identity and practices, most eloquently expressed in Laborde's idea of civic patriotism. Yet, it is probably not the case that political culture, unlike wider culture, is 'comparatively easy to elucidate' (Parekh, cited in Laborde, 2002: 611) . Indeed, I submit that there is something in the culturalized nature of public (non-)debates that makes this ideal extremely difficult to achieve.
Political theory and realism
These culturalization-of-politics syndromes should not be blamed on political theory. After all, theory should supply normative measures and standards for public life, to be used by politicians and citizens who struggle to improve the latter. Rawls famously warned political theorists not to let their trade become political in the wrong way, i.e. in a way that simply adapted to he imperfectly just circumstances of the day (Rawls, 1985) . Yet, we also need theory -including theories of political culture -which can link the claims and ideals of normative theory to accounts of politics and public life, which takes social science knowledge about it seriously. Such theory needs to accommodate at least three kinds of contingency.
First of all, the new focus on how to achieve cohesion and civic competences is already concerned with sociological questions and background ontologies of human motivation. Yet engagement with social science knowledge remains unsystematic, even anecdotal. Moreover, debates on constitutional patriotism and liberal nationalism exhibit a tension, rarely acknowledged, between more sociologically inclined work and traditional moral philosophy, which restricts itself to modelling certain background assumptions, or -as in Rawls' Political Liberalism (1993) -to discussing realism and 'stability', in terms of morally reasonable motivations to support a system of justice.
Secondly, conceptual registries of community and pluralism are linked to real-life discourses and contests. Theory is much less autonomous, more reflective of national ideological traditions, including blind-spots and agony points, than authors admit . Should political theory produce more context-independent concepts and arguments? This is only a half-solution. The bluntness and institutional dependency of concepts is not merely analytical but also normative. For instance, French, American, British or Danish meanings of secularism are different. They correspond to different political and social forms, traditions of church -state relations and views on education and socialization, each with its advantages and disadvantages. The same can be said of the embeddings of democracy, citizenship, equality and autonomy. Indeed, and further to the first point, theory may reflect diverse empirical sources of cohesion, solidarity and trust in different countries -in part to do with different histories of political settlement, or differently established roles and commitments of different groups, civil society and the state. Abstract normative theory cannot always settle which national embedding is intrinsically better, although it certainly should help us criticize some manifestations of them all.
If this leads theorists to cast themselves as interpreters, reconstructing the critical potential of this or that constitutional tradition or public philosophy, they should also, as a third contingency, take seriously the way that public discourse itself generates identity and solidarity and more particularly the way that theoretical arguments and principles become inserted into real-life debates. Political theory -or some of it at any rateneeds to be self-reflective and to engage with the murky business of power, rhetoric and strategy, and the constructions of antagonistic Feinbildsconstructions which not only emerge with the old-fashioned registers of nationalism but also take on civic guises.
Constituting communities: culture, identity and identification
Some authors would argue that the new call for civics is exaggerated. Powerful states have always found ways to integrate their populations and manage diversity (Eder, this volume) , of course. Arguably, the first conditions of minorities' wish to belong are effective policies of social and labour market integration and effective anti-discrimination -and possibly a set of multicultural rights which balance the bias of national public spaces with certain liberal exception rights, protections of minority heritage and symbolic recognitions. That the latter is positively damaging is certainly disputed (Banting and Kymlicka, 2006) . Even so, the engagement in political theory with issues of civic education, the reconstruction of political identity, the cultivation of civic virtue and democratic competences are here to stay.
However, if real-life civic languages often freeze into complacent selfdescription and stereotypes of inherently uncivic values, identities and practices on the part of others, could it be that an idea of political community should be sought neither at a level of observable cultural traits nor at a level of identity?
As regards the former, if understood as actual political practices and ideals of a group, it is true that modern states require citizens with strong civic Culture, as distinct from uncivic passivity and lack of reflection. But there is more than one way to be a good citizen, just as there is more than one conceptualization of the universal values of liberal constitutions. Such conceptualizations continue to divide the proponents of influential, yet competing strands of political theory. In real life, they neither internally unite all groups inside nations nor clearly differentiate among the latter. Languages of identity often involve us in strongly politicized representations of particular traditions, character traits and memories, which we ought to share. The conceptual ambiguity of a purely political patriotism, bridging the imaginations and projects of groups with different lineages of community entry, loyalty and desert, as well as what we know of real-world representations of 'our' values, identities and practices as essential, unchanging and sacred, suggests caution for a normative programme. Education in democracy, respect for human rights and tolerance are stable elements of liberal non-neutrality and may need further strengthening in schools. Also, familiarity with ways of social and political interaction and main aspects of political history and discourse is extremely important for newcomers who wish to make their mark as active citizens. However, forcing the specific political ways and identities of a national majority onto minorities in an unreflective and self-congratulatory way is arguably no more feasible or morally defensible than old-fashioned cultural assimilation.
Instead, narratives of belonging, value and good citizenship could perhaps -ideally -become not just fixed entry requirements, but stakes in a debate with many voices. So could the micro-parameters of actually practised political debate, decision-making and being-together of national political cultures. With yet one more conceptual spin on the pregnant signifiers at hand (Mouritsen, 2006b: 5) , political languages or traditions are really uncivic or unpolitical when their meanings and references, their key ideals and defining practices, are themselves not contested and disputed, either because they belong to layers of practice which are barely reflected upon, or because they partake in ideological imagery, which is much too heavily identity-invested to be touched. Thus conceptualized, the constitution of a political community is less about sharing a given culture or identity, however thick or thin, and more about maintaining a political space where such cultures and identities are negotiated and contested.
This still leaves us with relatively demanding ideas of citizenship. Citizens of a public realm, short of a substantial identity, must still have identification with this realm. Identification denotes not being the same but being together or doing something together -in a civil way. Both aspects -sameness and interaction, maintenance of common culture/ identity and sharing in activities -are ancient republican themes, found from Machiavelli to Rousseau, and brought into normative sociology through Durkheim (Durkheim, 1992; Mouritsen, 2005b) . In fact, Durkheim did not think moderns would be integrated by talking about the meaning of political citizenship or even by practising it. It is possible -despite this book, written largely by political theorists, political scientists, and historians of political concepts -that the problem nowadays is the obsession with political virtues and practices in advanced welfare states, which really require so much more from us -getting an education, raising children, finding a job and paying taxes. After all, there were always other ways to contribute and share and to imagine such sharing, than those which reflect or take place in the public square.
